Federation Authorization Audit API

Compare @authenticated, @requiresScopes, @policy, and caller-defined authorization directives across supplied subgraph SDL. @requires, @key, @external, @provides, and @shareable are inspected for schema-level differences. audit_status is clean, findings_detected, invalid, or incomplete. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. A difference is not a runtime authorization result. No gateway is contacted.

Count object and interface fields in the supplied subgraph SDL and mark a field when its line, or its type line, contains one of the supplied directive names. Coverage is the share of marked fields. This is a text count. It does not compose a supergraph or decide whether a request would be allowed.

Compare caller-supplied subgraph endpoints, router authentication, network rules, and service or ingress labels with the intended public subgraph list. audit_status is clean, findings_detected, incomplete, or invalid. risk_level is low, medium, high, or critical. A public label is not evidence that an endpoint is reachable. No URL is probed.

Walk object-type references in the supplied SDL, starting at Query when that type is present. Scalars are ignored and a repeated type is not walked again. The index is that depth. The risk score rises when the depth passes the supplied limit, and when introspection is enabled. No router is contacted.